By Steve Bishop
The significance of India in the post war and subsequent Cold War period cannot be overstated. In this detailed study by McGarr, the clandestine activities of British and United States intelligence agencies, in particular the efforts of the CIA, in distorting diplomatic relationships with the West is outlined in forensic detail.
Independence in 1947 brought with it the imperialist imposition of partition, with India divided into the states of India and West and East Pakistan, subsequently Pakistan and Bangladesh. The divide reflected a desire for a Muslim majority in Pakistan and a predominantly Hindu India, though politically India was non-aligned in its international allegiances.
In terms of both geography and antipathy towards its former colonial power Britain, India did maintain a close relationship with the Soviet Union. Inevitably this was a cause for concern for both the British and the United States, a concern that grew with the success of the Chinese revolution in 1949 and Western fears that the whole of South Asia could turn towards communism.
These fears were fuelled by the strength of the Communist Party of India (CPI), especially in the states of Kerala and Bengal, and fears that communist influence in these states could result in a domino effect across the country.
It is against this background that McGarr charts the Cold War history of Western intelligence interventions across the country, the fear of the Soviet example and the effort to stamp out communist influence both domestically and internationally.
Both Britain and the United States viewed India’s adherence to non-alignment in the international arena with suspicion and fashioned their approach to the politics of India through their own Cold War biases and prejudice. McGarr outlines how this approach did not align with the politics of the sub-continent in which the Indian leadership under Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and subsequently Indira Gandhi retained an antipathy towards British colonial rule and was more concerned with the threat of Hindu nationalism than any supposed communist threat.
McGarr does not shy away from the fact that the intelligence services of the Soviet Union were also active in India or that the CPI benefited from the support of the Soviet Union. A wide range of Soviet publications were on offer throughout India and the CPI was clearly instrumental in popularising the changes in the Soviet Union, especially in relation to the successes in day to day realities to which Indians could relate, such as agriculture and housing.
The success of the CPI in state elections in Kerala, in the South of India in 1957, set alarm bells ringing with the intelligence services. As McGarr states,
“Following the CPI’s success in Kerala, Washington ensured that US economic aid and development projects in the subcontinent were redirected, wherever possible, to, ‘bear more directly on the situation in South India’. In addition, Eisenhower authorised the CIA to initiate a covert operation to subvert the communist state government.” (p.89)
By channelling funds to India’s ruling Congress Party and fomenting industrial and political unrest in Kerala the CIA succeeded in ensuring that in 1959, “the CPI government was dismissed from office under an executive order issued by India’s President.” (p.90)
The conflict with China in 1962, over disputed border territory, did afford the West the opportunity to press the case for the loosening of India’s position of non-alignment in the international arena. Chinese troops crossed the border into India in October 1962, to secure the disputed territory, and quickly overwhelmed Indian divisions. Just one month later, in November 1962, India’s Intelligence Bureau reached an agreement with the CIA to support training and logistics for a new paramilitary force to be deployed on India’s northern border.
While the Indian intelligence services saw this as an opportunity to strengthen their northern defences the CIA was equally concerned with fuelling discontent in Tibet. As McGarr states,
“Its purpose was to keep the concept of an autonomous Tibet alive, both inside Tibet and amongst sympathetic foreign states. In the longer term the objective was to build a Tibetan resistance movement capable of exploiting favourable political developments within Communist China, should they occur.” (p.115)
McGarr details throughout the book the ambivalent relationship which the Indian state, under the Congress Party, had with the United States and in particular the CIA. It is clear that the CIA carried out significant covert activity without recourse to the Indian government. However, there were also examples of India calling upon support as in the dispute with China and in tackling the popularity of the CPI domestically.
McGarr draws out the complex web of suspicion, and at times reliance upon, Western intelligence services on the part of India’s establishment with detailed examples which make for compelling reading.
McGarr succeeds in conveying the importance of India in the struggle for influence in the Cold War and the extent to which the West feared an India moving towards the Soviet Union. Overall Spying in South Asia is a considered assessment, from a significant non-European angle, of a major period in twentieth century history.
Spying in South Asia: Britain, the United States, and India’s Secret Cold War (Cambridge UP, 2024).
Interested in a reviewing a book for us? Or a film, play or exhibition? Get in touch at info@liberationorg.co.uk
The views expressed in the articles published on this website do not necessarily represent those of Liberation
Support our work – donate, become a member, affiliate your local organisation’s branch or volunteer
