By Bob Newland
Readers could be forgiven for believing that the Special Operations Executive (SOE) only provided support for the French Resistance and that in Greece, Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Europe during the Second World War (WW2). That reflects the theme of available books, films and academic studies. This book, focussing on the SOE in Malaya with some references to Burma, seeks to correct that imbalance.
Kenneison identifies the SOE as Force 136, the name given to its Asian wing. As with its European operations, Force 136 largely supported communist led resistance movements in Malaya and Burma. This was not so much a political choice but one based on the reality that it was the communists who were committed to resisting Japanese occupation and best organised. It was hoped that through such support it may be possible to co-opt them into a post-war collaboration with Britain’s post-colonial plans.
Force 136 supported the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) organised and led by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The MCP was comprised overwhelmingly of ethnic Chinese. Not surprisingly Force 136 was deeply racist. Recruitment and training was dictated by a racial hierarchy and weapons distribution reflected this. Throughout the war there was a constant battle for weapons and training for the guerrillas.
Kenneison acknowledges that there were fewer military operations in Malaya than in Burma. Force 136 only infiltrated 300 men but established contact with all the local guerrilla groups. She focusses on the self-defeating impact of SOE in developing and training a force which was to challenge Britain’s long-term interests, the conflicting ambitions, expectations and aims of the British Government and the MCP, and finally the impact of Force 136 as an intelligence gathering organisation.
Of particular interest is the way in which the book demonstrates the contradictions within the British Secret Services, especially with regard to cooperation with communists. Overall, as was the case in Europe, those favouring working with the MCP as the most effective potential anti-Japanese force won the day. Their efforts were however frequently undermined or frustrated within the service and the Foreign Office.
These conflicts are also shown to have led to a complete lack of preparation of any defence against an initial Japanese invasion threat. Those who argued that preparing defence would provoke the Japanese dominated the pre-war argument much as the appeasers had limited the preparation for war in Europe.
Much of the resistance which was established in Malaya happened in defiance of central dictats. Force 136 operatives were recruited from the colonial police force and local businessmen who had stayed behind after the Japanese invasion. These Malay and Chinese dialect speakers were inserted to work with MPAJA groups and maintain liaison with the centre which sought through them to maintain control of events. More than 10,000 Malays were recruited, trained and armed through Force 136 despite the prevailing political view that to do so would be to build a trained guerrilla army which would fight against Britain in a post war independence struggle. Kenneison identifies the extraordinary conflict of Special Branch arresting key leaders of the MCP in 1941 while Force 136 was signing agreements with them to build this resistance.
For those who are aware of leading British communist theoretician James Klugmann’s key role in winning UK government support for Tito’s communist partisans in Yugoslavia as opposed to the nationalist forces there is a reference to a background discussion regarding Klugmann and the far east: ‘It has been suggested that James Klugmann, an active communist working for SOE in Cairo, pulled strings and rigged reports to ensure that communist guerrillas were backed in the field over other groups.’ While Klugmann undoubtedly used his position to influence these decisions, they were probably inevitable given the reality of the situation on the ground.
Behind the scenes, there was also conflict between Force 136 and MI6 which had been pushed aside because of its anti-communism which was seen to have contributed to the failure to defend Burma and Malaya against the Japanese. Mountbatten appears to have sided with Force 136 in this struggle for power and influence. Kenneison also explores the interesting and often contradictory relationship between SOE and US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) its American equivalent. OSS was led by an Anglophile, William Donovan, which enabled extensive co-operation. Despite this the British remained suspicious of him because of his and the US opposition to colonialism. This is a recurring theme. US opposition to colonialism seems less related to their anti-colonial history than it does to its desire to open up additional post-war markets for their rapidly growing economy.
The relationship between Force 136 and the MPAJA was consolidated in a formal agreement signed in a jungle camp in Blantan, northern Malaya. This appears to be the source of considerable controversy especially with regard to the status of the MCP and the post war settlement. Neither of these are specifically mentioned in the agreement but it is suggested that significant verbal agreement lay behind the written document. What does become clear is that Mountbatten delayed informing Whitehall of the aim of MPAJA/MCP to establish an independent Malaya after the war.
Among other issues explored in detail by the author is the efforts of SOE to build an alternative guerilla movement to that led by the communists. This was built around the nationalist Chinese, the Kuomintang (Guomindang), but appears to have achieved little success. She also examines the parallel army established by the MCP. When the MPAJA was disbanded and its weapons handed over, the parallel force remained under arms, many of which had been ‘bought’ from the retreating Japanese. The seeds of the post-war ‘Emergency’ were being sown.
While this is in many ways an academic book, the story it tells and the gaps in the established history of the period which it fills make for fascinating reading. I would recommend it to anyone who wants to learn more about this critical period of history and who wishes to gain a greater understanding of the wider issues which influenced the bloody battle for control of the region following WW2.
The Special Operations Executive in Malaya: Rebecca Kenneison Bloomsbury Academic £25.19 (eBook £20.10)
The views expressed in the articles published on this website do not necessarily represent those of Liberation.
Bob Newland is a former ‘London Recruit’ and a Liberation member.
Interested in a reviewing a book for us? Or a film, play or exhibition? Get in touch at info@liberationorg.co.uk
Support our work – donate, become a member, affiliate your local organisation’s branch or volunteer
